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The proper fanctioning of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) depends in part upon three international organizations, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and the International Office of
Epiwotics (OIE). The SPS Agreement states that the sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) standards of these organizations are the benchmark
international standards for WTO members, and recent WTO decisions
demonstrate the importance of international standards in the settlement
of WTO disputes involving SPS measures. The Codex, IPPC, and OIE
also provide valuable services that benefit the WTO, such as advising
developing countries on technical matters concerning SPS issues.
This article describes the roles of these international organizations
in the SPS Agreement. It also examines how the new responsibilities
given to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE in the SPS Agreement might change
these international bodies.
I.

INTRODUCTION.

The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 1 (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which emerged out of the eight years of negotiations of the Uruguay
Round, has the potential to liberalize greatly agricultural trade. One ob* Sterwart and Stewart retains the compyright to this article. An earlier version of it
appeared in the Aggricultural Sanitary & Phytosanitary and Standards Report (March 1998), a
publication by Sterwart and Stewart.
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Cross; M.B.A., Harvard University, J.D.; Georgetown University.
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I. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS URUGUAY RouNo, vol. 31 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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jective of the drafters of the SPS Agreement was to harmonize the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures 2 of the members of the WTO.
To achieve this goal, the SPS Agreement encourages WTO members
when creating or maintaining SPS measures to rely upon the SPS standards established by three international organizations: the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC), and the International Office of Epizootics (OIE). 3
These organizations address, respectively, issues concerning human,
plant, and animal life and health.
These three organizations are recognized by the world's food and
agricultural communities as the premier international bodies for the establishment of SPS standards and for the coordination of information
concerning SPS issues. 4 The standards they set are voted upon by the
delegates of each member country to these organizations; these delegates are generally scientists employed by their respective national governments. While the participation of their numerous members has
ensured that these organizations have never been immune to politics, the
Codex, IPPC, and OIE are scientific bodies whose decisions have traditionally not been the subject of great political concern. The standards
they promulgate are advisory and thus not legally binding, so their standards rarely receive significant attention outside of scientific circles. 5
The Codex, IPPC, and OIE were created well prior to the adoption
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and they are now adjusting to the
new role in the international trading system that was established for
them through the SPS Agreement. The reliance on these three organizations within the SPS Agreement has already brought changes to these
international bodies. As shown by the first three, and presently only,
2. Sanitary measures concern human and animal health. Phytosanitary measures apply to
plants. The SPS Agreement provides a definition of sanitary or phytosanitary measure at Annex

lA.
3. As the International Office of Epizootics is based in Paris, it is most often referred to by
the acronym "OIE"; this organization's title in French is the "Office International des Epizooties."
4. The acceptance of these organizations as the leading international bodies in their fields is
demonstrated by their prominence in the SPS Agreement. Further, the U.S. Department of Agriculture noted that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) "officially recognized the
Office of International Epizootics (OIE) as the forum for global standards in animal health, Codex
Alimentarius (Codex) for food safety standards, and the International Plant Protection Convention
(IPPC) for plant health standards." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL AND PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE (APHIS) TRADE SUPPORT TEAM, NAFTA AND GATT IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 4 (November 2, 1995).
5. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997), at 18.62 [hereinafter Beef Hormone - Canada Panel]; World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, WT/
DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), at 'i 8.59 [hereinafter Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel].
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WTO disputes resolved under the SPS Agreement, the European Communities (EC)-beef hormone dispute, 6 the Australian-salmon dispute, 7
and the Japan - agricultural products dispute, 8 the adjudication of major
international trade conflicts can now turn at least in part upon the standards of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Even if these standards remain
solely advisory, the stakes for WTO members in international SPS standards have become higher, and the potential exists for an increased
politicization of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE processes when new standards are being set. Questions have also arisen within these organizations as to their structural capabilities to fulfill their new roles.
This article examines the provisions of the SPS Agreement that relate to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. It describes the importance of the
international standards of these organizations in the outcome of disputes
involving SPS measures resolved through the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding) of the WTO. 9 The article then discusses the Codex, IPPC, and OIE themselves, how they have changed since the
implementation of the SPS Agreement, and how they might change in
the future.
II.

THE SPS AGREEMENT.

References to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE are made directly and indirectly in various articles located throughout the SPS Agreement.
These three bodies are the only international organizations mentioned by
name in the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, whenever the SPS Agreement refers to the "relevant" or "appropriate" international organizations, it is presumably referring to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE among
possibly others. 10
6. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body: EC Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-1997-4 (Jan. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter Beef Hormone - Appellate Report]; See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5;
see also, Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5.
7. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/R (Jun. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Australia - Salmon Panel]; World Trade
Organization, Report of the Appellate Body: Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, AB-1998-5 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australia - Salmon Appellate
Report].
8. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Japan - Agricultural Products].
9. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 1.L.M.
114 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
10. Although the Codex, IPPC, and OIE are the only international organizations listed in the
SPS Agreement, other international bodies concerned with SPS issues are affiliated with the
WTO. The following, along with the Codex, IPPC, and OIE have regular observer status at the
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Harmonization.

The Codex, IPPC, and OIE are designated to play a major role in
the harmonization process of SPS measures envisioned in the SPS
Agreement. Article 3.1 obligates members to base their SPS measures
on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations "where
they exist." The SPS Agreement at Annex A specifically defines "international standards, guidelines or recommendations" as the standards,
guidelines, or recommendations established by the Codex, IPPC, or OIE.
However, Article 3.3 permits members to maintain higher standards
than the international norm as established by international standards,
guidelines, and recommendations if a member's measures are based
upon science or if such measures are the "consequence of the level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5." Article 5
requires WTO members to base their SPS measures upon risk
assessments.
In regard to disputes arising under the SPS Agreement, Article 3.2
provides perhaps the most important provision pertaining to the roles of
the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. It states that SPS measures of WTO members that are in conformity with international standards, guidelines, or
recommendations shall be "presumed to be consistent with the relevant
provisions of this Agreement." Therefore, in an SPS dispute adjudicated
through the WTO' s dispute settlement process, if a member adopts
measures that are identical or similar to the standards promulgated by
the Codex, IPPC, or OIE, the member's measures will presumably be
found consistent with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.
Article 3.4 states that WTO members must participate "within the
limits of their resources" in the relevant international bodies, and "in
particular" the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Accordingly, members are expected to promote the development of standards within these international organizations. Under Article 3.5, the WTO Committee on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) will monitor international harmonization activities and will coordinate this effort with
the "relevant international organizations," which presumably include the
Codex, IPPC, and OIE.
WTO: the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
International Trade Centre (ITC), and the International Standards Organization (ISO). World
Trade Organization, The Committee (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/eol/e/wto03/
wto3_36.html>.
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Risk Assessment.

Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, which requires risk assessments
for the establishment and maintenance of SPS measures, creates a role
for the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Article 5.1 states that in developing risk
assessments for SPS measures, members must take into consideration
the risk assessment processes developed by the "relevant international
organizations," which can be assumed to include the Codex, IPPC, and
OIE. If scientific evidence is lacking concerning an SPS measure, Article 5. 7 provides that members are permitted to adopt provisional measures based upon available information, such as that developed by the
"relevant international organizations." Under Article 5.8, in situations
where a member believes that a measure of another member does not
conform with the "relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations," and the measure either interferes with or has the potential
to interfere with that country's exports, that member can request that the
other member provide it with explanations for the measure, and the other
member will be obligated to respond.
C.

Differing Regional Conditions.

Article 6 requires WTO members to recognize that pests and diseases occur in distinct regions and do not necessarily inflict all areas of a
country. For example, a member would most likely violate its WTO
obligations if it prevented imports of all fruit from the United States due
to the presence of the Mediterranean fruit fly in only one state, Hawaii. 11
According to Article 6.1, members should take into consideration the
guidelines of the "relevant international organizations" in determining
pest- and disease-free areas.
D.

Provisions Related to Developing Countries.

The SPS Agreement at Article 9 .1 obligates members to agree to
provide technical assistance to developing countries to help them adjust
to the requirements of the SPS Agreement; members may contribute this
assistance through the "appropriate international organizations." Under
Article 10.4, members should encourage developing countries to take
part in the "relevant international organizations."
The Codex, IPPC, and OIE have traditionally provided technical
assistance to developing countries to help them address SPS threats, so
these international organizations are well prepared to fulfill these provi11. U.S. Department of Agriculture, APHIS, Plant Protection and Quarantine, The Mediterranean Fruit Fly (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/fsmedfty.html>.
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sions of the SPS Agreement. 12 However, with increased technical
assistance demands being made upon them since the end of the Uruguay
Round, the Codex, IPPC, and OIE might in the future find it difficult to
respond to these requests. 13

E.

Dispute Settlement.

Article 11.3 states that the SPS Agreement does not impair the
rights of members to utilize the dispute settlement procedures of other
international organizations. For example, two members of both the
WTO and IPPC could choose to settle a dispute through either the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO or through the nonbinding and seldom used dispute settlement mechanism of the IPPC.
Under Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, dispute settlement panels
should in disputes involving technical or scientific issues consult with
experts in the relevant fields. In doing so, a panel may create a technical
experts group or consult with the "relevant international organizations."
The DSU, which is a separate instrument from the SPS Agreement,
restates in Article 13 the provisions of the SPS Agreement that dispute
settlement panels can obtain information from experts in the relevant
fields. Article 13.2 of the DSU goes on to provide that "a panel may
request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group." Appendix 4 of the DSU elaborates upon the establishment and functions of
expert review groups.
The panels in the EC-beef hormone, the Australia-salmon, and the
Japan-agricultural products disputes declined to form expert review
groups. 14 The beef hormone panels expressed concerns that expert review groups would have to find consensus on certain matters, which
would complicate the groups' processes. 15 Instead of forming expert
groups, the EC-beef hormone, Australia-salmon, and Japan-agricultural
products panels sought scientific information from individual ·experts. 16
12. FooD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (FAO) OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 6 (1997); International Office of
Epizootics, (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.oie.org/press/a_960911.htm>.
13. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (FAO) OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 6 (1997).
14. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <JI 6.3; see also Japan Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at <JI 6.2.
15. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7.
16. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <JI 6.3, 6.4; see also
Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at <JI 6.2.
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The WTO Appellate Body in the beef hormone appellate decision upheld the ability of panels to request opinions of individual scientists
rather than form expert review groups. 17 Further, in the beef hormone
disputes, the Codex provided the panels with names of possible nominees to serve as experts, and a scientist from the Secretariat of the Codex
became an expert for the panel. 18 The panels in the Australia-salmon
and Japan-agricultural products disputes asked the advice of the OIE and
IPPC, respectively, when selecting experts. 19 Whether or not future
panels establish expert review groups, the Codex, IPPC, and OIE will
likely be substantially involved in providing scientific assistance to
panels.
F.

The SPS Committee.

The functioning of the SPS Committee, which is established in Article 12, relies heavily upon the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Article 12.2
states that the SPS Committee is required to encourage WTO members
to base their measures upon international standards, guidelines, or recommendations. The SPS Committee under Article 12.3 should discuss
scientific and technical matters with international SPS organizations,
and in particular the Codex, IPPC, and OIE, with the aim of obtaining
the best scientific information. Article 12.6 provides that the SPS Committee may also ask these organizations to examine matters concerning
certain SPS standards.
Article 12.4 requires the SPS Committee to establish a procedure to
follow the progress of international harmonization efforts and the utilization of international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. The
SPS Committee is expected to work with the "relevant international organizations" to develop a list of international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations that affect international trade. Members should indicate which of these standards they require for the importation of products. If a member does not use an international standard, guideline, or
recommendation, the member should explain why its policies vary from
the international standard. When a member ceases using an international standard, guideline, or recommendation, it should either explain
its action to the Secretariat of the WTO and to the "relevant international
organizations" or through the procedures elaborated in Annex B of the
SPS Agreement, which concerns transparency.
17. See Beef Hormone - Appellate Report, supra note 6, at «JI 149.
18. See Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at«)[«)[ 6.6, 6.10.
19. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 16.2; see also Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at «JI 6.2.
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The SPS Committee is in the process of monitoring the international harmonization of SPS measures, and it implemented a provisional
procedure for this purpose at its meeting in October 1997. 20 The SPS
Committee plans to review the success of this provisional procedure
eighteen months after the procedure's adoption.

G.

Transparency.

Annex B of the SPS Agreement states that if a member's proposed
SPS measure deviates from an international standard, guideline, or recommendation, or if no such international standard exists, and if the measure has a major impact on trade, the member must notify other
countries of this proposed measure "at an early stage." If requested, the
member must explain to other members how the proposed measure varies from international standards, guidelines, or recommendations.
III.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT DECISIONS.

At present, three disputes involving SPS measures have been resolved through the DSU of the WTO. The existence of international
SPS standards played a role, directly or indirectly, in each of these disputes. As demonstrated by the EC-beef hormone panel and appellate
body decisions, the Australia-salmon panel and appellate body decisions, and the panel decision in the Japan-agricultural products dispute,
now that major international trade disputes can be influenced on the basis of international standards, the members of the WTO have incentives
to see that the new standards of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE conform with
current or possible future national SPS measures.

A.

The Beef Hormone Dispute.

In 1988, the European Communities prohibited the use of growth
promoting hormones in beef production, and an import ban on hormone
treated meat was implemented in 1989. 21 The United States and Canada
claimed that the use of hormones for growth promotion purposes in beef
cattle was safe and posed no threat to human health. They contended
that the European Communities' policy was scientifically unfounded and
20. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Procedure to Monitor the Process of International Harmonization, G/SPS/11 (Oct. 22, 1997).
21. U.S. Trade Representative, 1996 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (1996), at 98.
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was designed to protect EC beef producers from competition. 22 The European Communities countered by stating that beef hormones might
threaten human health and claimed that science supported its policy.
1.

The WTO Panel Decisions.

WTO-based consultations regarding the beef hormone controversy
were held in 1996 between the European Communities and Canada, and
the European Communities and the United States, but these talks did not
result in mutually satisfactory solutions for the parties, and WTO dispute
settlement panels were subsequently formed. 23 The two panels released
their final reports on August 18, 1997.
Included among their arguments before the panels, the United
States and Canada contended that the European Communities' prohibition on the importation of hormone-treated beef violated the European
Communities' obligations under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement as the
European Communities failed to base its measure upon international
standards. 24 The Codex maintains standards for five of the six hormones
under dispute. 25 According to the Codex, these five hormones, when
used according to sound veterinary practices for purposes of growth promotion in beef cattle, do not pose risks to human health. 26 The panels
determined that the European Communities' measures varied from the
international standards of the Codex and thus were not in conformity
with Article 3.1. 2 1
Article 3.3 makes it clear that a WTO member is not required to
base its SPS measures upon international standards. Article 3.3 provides
that a member may maintain higher standards than the international
norm, but only if such measures are based upon science or if they operate "as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant
provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5." Article 5 requires
that members base their measures upon risk assessments.
22. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.242; see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.239.
23. See Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 1.3.
24. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.46, 8.47; see Beef Hormone U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.43, 8.44.
25. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.61, 8.62; see Beef Hormone U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.58, 8.59.
26. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.63, 8.73; see Beef Hormone U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.60, 8.70.
27. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 9.1; see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 9.1.
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The European Communities claimed that risk assessments supported its position. 28 The panels determined, however, that the European Communities failed to demonstrate that its measures were indeed
based upon risk assessments as required in Article 3.3. 29 Therefore, the
panels held that the European Communities' policy on beef hormones
contravened the European Communities' obligations under the SPS
Agreement.
2.

The WTO Appellate Body Decision.

The European Communities appealed the findings of the panels,
and the WTO Appellate Body released its report on January 16, 1998.
While the Appellate Body's decision rejected a number of arguments put
forward by the panels, it affirmed the panels' conclusions that the European Communities' beef hormone policy violated Article 3.3 as it was
not based upon a risk assessment. 30 In its report, the Appellate Body
emphasized that voluntary standards of international organizations such
as the Codex are not transformed into mandatory standards for WTO
members. 31 Rather, members are permitted under Article 3.3 to maintain SPS measures that are higher than the international norm (i.e.,
higher than the standards of the relevant international organizations), but
such measures must be based upon risk assessments as described in Article 5. 32
B.

The Australia-Salmon Dispute.

On October 5, 1995, Canada requested WTO-based consultations
with Australia regarding Australia's ban on the importation of fresh,
chilled, and frozen salmon from Canada. 33 Australia contended that its
prohibition of such imports, which became operative in 1975, 34 was necessary to protect Australian fish from up to 24 diseases that could enter
the country through imported salmon from Canada. 35 The establishment
of these diseases could have damaging economic and biological consequences for Australia's fisheries. 36
28. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.111, 8.112, 8.114, 8.152; see
Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at 'Jiii[ 8.108, 8.109, 8.lll, 8.149.
29. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.158, 8.261, 9.1, 8.82; see Beef
Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.156, 8.261, 9.l, 8.79.
30. See Beef Hormone - Appellate Report, supra note 6, at <J[<J[ 208, 209.
31. Id. at <J[ 165.
32. Id. at <JI 177.
33. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <JI 1.1.
34. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at TI 2.14, 2.15.
35. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 1'I 4.34, 4.35.
36. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 1 4.35.
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The WTO Panel Decision.

A WTO panel was formed on April 10, 1997. 37 Canada claimed
that Australia's policy was not founded upon science and was a disguised restriction to international trade. 38 Canada also contended that
Australia violated Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement as the disputed
measure was not based upon an international standard of the relevant
international organization, the OIE, and the measure did not meet the
requirements of Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. 39 Article 3.3 permits
WTO members to maintain standards that are higher than international
standards, but only if they are based upon science or are a "consequence
of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines
to be appropriate" and are based upon risk assessments.
Australia countered that it did not claim that its measure on salmon
imports was based upon OIE standards. 40 After all, OIE standards did
not exist for all of the 24 diseases from which Australia was seeking
protection, and the OIE had no guidelines for salmon as a specific product.41 Australia contended that the lack of OIE guidelines for all of the
24 diseases meant in effect that no appropriate OIE guideline existed
upon which Australia could base its measure. 42
The panel's report, which was released on June 12, 1998, did not
address Canada's claims concerning Australia's failure to base its measure upon OIE standards. Rather, the panel found that Australia was in
violation of the SPS Agreement as it ( 1) did not base its salmon import
regulation upon a risk assessment (in violation of Article 5.1 and thus by
extension Article 2.2, which requires that SPS measures be based upon
scientific principles); (2) was applying arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of SPS protection for measures for different situations,
i.e., was applying more restrictive measures to imports of salmon than to
imports of ornamental live fish although the latter posed higher risks, 43
which resulted in a disguised restriction on international trade (in violation of Articles 5.5 and 2.3); and (3) was maintaining an SPS measure
37. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 1.4.
38. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <J[<J[ 4.52 and 4.209.
39. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 3.2.
40. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 8.45.
41. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at CJ[ 8.46. Of the 24 diseases from which
Australia contended it sought protection, two were included on the OIE's list of "Notifiable Diseases" and four were on the OIE's "Other Diseases" list. See also Australia - Salmon Panel, supra
note 7, at 'I 2.24.
42. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at'{ 4.104. The panel stated that lack of OIE
guidelines for all of the 24 diseases did not make irrelevant the existence of OIE guidelines for
some of the diseases. See also Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 8.46.
43. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I'll 8.137 and 8.160.
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that was more trade-restrictive than necessary to reach Australia's appropriate level of SPS protection (in violation of Article 5.6). 44 As the
panel found that Australia was violating these provisions, the panel
stated that it "[saw] no need to further examine Canada's other claims
under ... Article 3."4 5
While the Australia-salmon panel decision did not tum directly
upon an international standard, the OIE' s guidelines figured prominently
in the arguments of both Canada and Australia. In addition, the panelists
looked to the OIE for guidance when addressing other issues, such as
whether Australia presented the panelists with a risk assessment. 46
2.

The WTO Appellate Body Decision.

Australia announced on July 22, 1998, that it would appeal the
panel's decision, 47 and the Appellate Body of the WTO released its report on the salmon dispute on October 20, 1998. While the Appellate
Body struck down some of the findings contained in the panel's report,
the Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision that Australia's policy
regarding the importation of salmon violated that country's obligations
under the SPS Agreement. Namely, the Appellate Body, like the panel,
found that Australia's policy as applied to ocean-caught salmon contravened Australia's obligations under Article 5.1 as the relevant measure
was not based upon a risk assessment, and therefore, Australia's policy
also violated Article 2.2, which requires that SPS measures be based
upon scientific evidence. 48 The Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that Australia, by maintaining unjustifiable distinctions in levels of
SPS protection in different situations, was imposing a disguised restriction on international trade in violation of Articles 5.5 and 2.3. 49 The
Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that Australia's measure as
applied to ocean-caught salmon was more trade restrictive than necessary, and thus in violation of Article 5.6, as the panel premised its finding upon the wrong SPS measure; i.e., the panel addressed Australia's
heat treatment for salmon as opposed to Australia's ban on the importation of salmon. 5 ° Further, due to a lack of adequate facts in the record,
44. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'l'I 9.1, 8.52.
45. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 1 8.184.
46. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I'll 8.70, 8.71, 8.78, and 8.80.
47. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes, at 5
(visited Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>.
48. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 123-24
49. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 85-86, 93, and 124.
50. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 124.
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the Appellate Body was unable to determine whether Australia's import
prohibition was inconsistent with Article 5.6. 51
The Appellate Body limited its examination to the findings of the
panel, and as the measures of the OIE did not play a prominent role in
the panel's decision, the Appellate Body did not examine issues directly
related to the OIE. However, as with the panel, the Appellate Body
looked to the OIE's guidelines when determining whether Australia's
measure was based upon a risk assessment. 52
C.

The Japan - Agricultural Products WTO Panel Report.

The panel's decision in the Japan-agricultural products dispute did
not rely directly upon the international standards, guidelines, or recommendations of the Codex, OIE, or IPPC, and none of these organizations
were named in the findings or conclusions of the panel. However, the
IPPC' s risk assessment guidelines were discussed in the factual section
of the panel report, in the arguments of the parties, and in the panel's
consultation with its scientific experts.
1.

Background of Dispute.

On April 7, 1997, the United States requested consultations with
Japan regarding Japan's approval process for the importation of certain
agricultural products. 53 The United States alleged that Japan prohibited
the importation of individual varieties of some agricultural products until each variety had been tested for the required quarantine treatment. 54
For example, instead of requiring that apples imported from the United
States meet Japan's quarantine requirements concerning a certain plant
pest, the codling moth, Japan mandated that testing be conducted on
each variety of apple before different varieties could be imported. 55
Thus, even though Japan had approved the importation of certain "red
delicious" apples as the United States had proven that apples of this
variety could be effectively treated for the codling moth, the United
States was unable to export other varieties, such as "Fujis" or
"Braeburns." 56 The United States claimed that it took from two to four
years to conducts the necessary tests, these tests were expensive, and
that Japan's policy adversely impacted U.S. agricultural exports and vio51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 124.
Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 74.
Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at <J[<J[ 1.1, 4.23.
Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 1 1.2.
Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 11 1.2, 4.23.
Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at Table 2, p. 15.
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lated Japan's obligations under the SPS Agreement. 57 Japan claimed
that its policies were consistent with the requirements of the SPS
Agreement. 58

2.

Findings of the Panel.

The panel determined that Japan's policy contravened that country's obligations under the SPS Agreement as Japan's measure, as applied to applies, cherries, nectarines, and walnuts, was not based upon
scientific evidence, in violation of Article 2.2, and was more trade restrictive than necessary in violation of Article 5 .6. 59 In addition, as Japan's measure was not published, the panel held that Japan was in
violation of Article 7 and Annex B .1, both of which concern transparency. 60 According to press reports, Japan intends to appeal the findings of the panel. 61

3.

The IPPC and the Panel Report.

The United States contended that Japan had failed to base its policy
upon risk assessments and that Japan was thus in violation of Article
5.1. 62 Japan claimed, however, that it had conducted such assessments
under the procedures set forth in the risk assessment guidelines of the
IPPC. 63 The panel provided a detailed description of the IPPC's guidelines,64 and these guidelines figured prominently in the arguments of
both the United States and Japan concerning the issue of risk assessments.65 In the end, the panel decided not to address the issue of
whether Japan's policy was based upon risk assessments as required in
Article 5 .1 as the panel had already found that Japan was in violation of
Article 2.2 as its measure was not based upon scientific evidence. 66
IV.

THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION.

Of the standards established by the three international organizations
named in the SPS Agreement, those of the Codex have perhaps the
greatest potential to lead to conflicts among WTO members.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll'll 1.2, 4.23.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 3.3.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 9.1.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 9.1.
Doug Carder, Ruling may open market, THE PACKER, Nov. 2, 1998, at IA, col. 2.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 3.1.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 4.144.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll'll 2.29-2.33.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll'l! 4.143-4.169.
See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 8.63.
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Background on the Codex.

The Codex establishes standards relating to human health, and its
standards can concern additives, contaminants, and veterinary drug and
pesticide residues in foods. 67 The Codex was founded in 1962 by the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and
the World Health Organization (WH0). 68 It currently has 162 member
countries and is based in Rome. 69 The stated goal of the Codex is "to
guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of definitions and
requirements for foods, to assist in their harmonization and, in doing so,
to facilitate international trade." 70
Most of the work of the Codex is conducted through its various
committees, which consist of delegates from its member states. Examples of these committees are the Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants and the Committee on Processed Fruits and Vegetables. 71
Standards of the Codex are established through a lengthy eight step process that provides members with the opportunity to comment on the proposed standards. 72 Throughout the Codex's history, most of its
standards have been adopted by consensus. 73 The Codex's standards,
guidelines, and principles fill 28 volumes, and the Codex has established
3200 maximum residue levels for pesticides alone since 1962. 74
B.

Recent Controversial Codex Decisions.

As the standards established by the Codex relate to human health,
they have caused more concerns for the populations of members of the
WTO than have the standards of the IPPC and OIE, which deal respectively with plant and animal health. Controversy increasingly surrounds
67. See generally Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the 2 J'1 Session, List of Standards and Related Texts Adopted by the 21st Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission,
ALINORM 95/37 (July 8, 1995) [hereinafter Codex 21'1 Report].
68. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Codex Office,
Codex Home Page, (visited Dec. 18, 1997) <http://www.usda.gov/fsis/codex/index.htm>.
69. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Latest News, (visited Aug. 4, 1998) <http://
www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/ECONOMIC/ESN/codex/lnews.htm>.
70. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, This is Codex Alimentarius 2 (2d ed.).
71. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the 22nd Session, Appendix V: Confirmation of Chairmanship of Codex Committees, ALINORM 97/37 (June 28, 1997) [hereinafter
Codex 22"ct Report].
72. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Standards
and Related Texts (The Codex "Step Procedure"), (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/
waicent/faoinfo/economic/esn/codex/procedl .htm.>
73. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.69, see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.66.
74. Supra note 70, at 2.
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the establishment of certain Codex standards, and the adoption of Codex
standards through consensus can no longer be assumed.
1.

Beef Hormones.

The first indication of such controversy following the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round occurred with the non-consensus approval of maximum residue levels for five growth promoting hormones, which would
become the focus of the beef hormone disputes at the WTO, at the
Twenty-First Session of the Codex in July 1995, just seven months after
the implementation of the SPS Agreement. At the request of the United
States, a secret vote was held on these standards, and they were approved with 33 delegates favoring their adoption, 29 opposing them, and
7 delegates abstaining from the vote. 75
Following the vote, the Observer of the European Communities
stated that the secret vote was unfortunate as it deviated from the Codex's goal to operate transparently. 76 The Observer also said that the
vote brought into question the validity of the Codex's standards and that
the European Communities might reconsider its participation in this
body. 77 The delegations of the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Spain,
and the United Kingdom dissociated themselves from parts or all of
these remarks. 7 s
The European Communities would later argue before the WTO
panels in the beef hormone disputes that the failure of the Codex to
adopt the beef hormone maximum residue levels through consensus
demonstrated the very controversy of using these standards. 79 The European Communities also stated that Codex members were accustomed to
adopting non-binding measures and were unaware that these standards
for beef hormones would in effect become mandatory for the member
states of the European Communities through the operation of the SPS
Agreement and the DSU. 80 The panels held, however, that nothing in
the SPS Agreement requires that votes on the measures of the relevant
75. See Codex 21'1 Report, supra note 67, at «JI 45.
76. Id. at «JI 46.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at «JI 8.69, see Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel,
supra note 5, at «JI 8.66.
80. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at «JI 8.71, see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at «JI 8.68. The Appellate Body in the beef hormone dispute held that the
voluntary standards of the relevant international organizations have not become mandatory standards for WTO members through the operation of the SPS Agreement. Members may maintain
SPS measures that are higher than international standards if these measures are based upon risk
assessments. See Beef Hormone - Appellate Report, supra note 6, at «J[«I 165, 177.
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international organizations be by consensus, so the European Communities' argument was irrelevant. 81

2.

Twenty-Second Session of the Codex.

The Twenty-Second Session of the Codex was held in Geneva in
June 1997 and provided further examples of disagreements over the
adoption of new standards. The release of the interim panel reports in
the beef hormone disputes only one month before this session most
likely influenced the decisions that were made there. 82

a.

Bovine Somatotropin.

Bovine somatotropin (BST) is injected into dairy cows and increases their milk production. 83 Its use is common in some major dairy
producing countries, such as the United States. 84 At the Twenty-Second
Session of the Codex, a vote was held on a draft standard for maximum
residue levels for BST. In the debates preceding the vote, the Codex
was divided into two groups: those who sought to adopt the draft standard at Step 8 of the Codex's standard-setting process and those who
favored postponing consideration of its adoption pending the reevaluation of scientific information. 85
The delegations that favored adopting the BST standard contended
that thorough scientific evaluations of BST had already been conducted
by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants (JECFA) and the Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs
in Foods (CCRVDF), no new scientific evidence had been presented at
the Codex meeting, and therefore a reevaluation was not needed. 86
These delegations contended that the adoption of the draft standard
would logically follow the conclusions of the JECFA and CCRVDF
while also liberalizing trade by preventing the adoption of unfounded
trade barriers. 87
Those delegations opposing the adoption of the standard, as well as
an observer from a non-governmental organization, Consumers Interna81. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at 'J[ 8.72, see Beef Hormone - U.S.
Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.69. The Appellate Body did not address the issue of non-consensus
decisions by the relevant international organizations in its report for the beef hormone dispute.
82. See Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at 'J[ 1.10.
83. H. Allen Tucker, Michigan State University, Department of Animal Science, Safety of
Bovine Somatotropin (bST), at 1, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.canr.msu.edu/dept/ans/
mdrx224.html>.
84. Id.
85. See Codex 22nd Report, supra note 71.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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tional, claimed that new evidence demonstrated that the administration
of BST can increase the likelihood of viral and bacterial infections and
mastisis in cattle, which could lead to the further usage of antibiotics in
dairy cattle. 88 Delegations also argued that factors besides science
should be taken into consideration, and the delegation of the Netherlands, representing the views of the European Communities' member
countries, as well as the observer from Consumers International, claimed
that consumers were opposed to the use of BST. 89
Upon a motion of the Netherlands, a vote was held to postpone the
consideration of the adoption of the proposed BST maximum residue
level pending the reevaluation of the scientific information and an examination of other factors, most likely including consumer preferences. 90
This resolution passed with 38 members voting for it, 21 delegations
against it, and 13 countries abstaining. 91 The member states of the European Communities, as well as most countries seeking admission to the
European Communities, voted in favor of the resolution while the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were among the
countries opposing its adoption. 92

b.

Natural Mineral Waters.

Discussions on a draft standard for natural mineral waters at the
Twenty-Second Session of the Codex were also controversial and resulted in a close vote. As reported out of the Codex Committee on Natural Mineral Waters in October 1996, this draft standard did not permit
microbial treatments of natural mineral water. 93 Instead, the draft standard comported with the traditional means of producing natural mineral
waters in Europe, a process which protects the purity of water by bottling it at its source. 94 Some delegations supporting the adoption of the
standard stated that they would not oppose the creation of another standard for bottled waters besides "natural mineral waters." 95 Countries
opposing the adoption of the draft natural mineral water standard, such
as Japan, expressed concerns about an international standard that would
prohibit the use of microbial treatments as certain conditions, presumably including water quality, vary throughout the world. 96
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Perhaps recognizing the influence of the European Communities
over countries seeking admission to it, Japan requested that secret ballots be used when a roll call vote was proposed for this draft standard,
but Japan's proposal was rejected by a show of hands. 97 In the actual
vote on the adoption of the proposed standard, some 33 countries voted
for the resolution while 31 voted against it, and 10 delegations abstained. 98 The member states of the European Communities and most
other European countries voted in favor of the draft standard. 99
Following the vote, the delegates of 16 countries expressed their
reservations about this new standard. 100 The United States issued a
statement denouncing it as a possible threat to public health and a nontariff trade barrier as it imposes restrictive requirements on the bottling
of water. 101 The vote on natural mineral waters also caused several
delegations to reiterate that the Codex should attempt to reach major
decisions through consensus.102
After the adoption of the standard for natural mineral waters, the
Codex assigned the Committee on Natural Mineral Waters with the task
of developing a draft standard for packaged water other than natural
mineral waters. 103

C.

Future Codex Standards.

It is likely that non-consensus decisions will become more common
in the standard-setting process of the Codex. 104 With the heightened
importance of Codex standards, the circle of those who follow this body
closely has grown beyond scientists and select government officials and
now includes others, most notably environmentalists and consumer advocates. The Codex is in the process of formulating draft standards on
genetically modified organisms (GM Os), and GM Os will almost cer97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. While the panels in the beef hormone disputes found no requirement for standards
to be consensually agreed upon, a future WTO panel may or may not be asked to consider the
consistency of standards decided by simple majority voting in these non-WTO entities with Articles IX and X of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
103. See Codex 22nd Report, supra note 71.
104. Further examples of non-consensus decisions of this international body might be provided at the next Codex session. The Twenty-Third Session of the Codex will begin in Rome on
June 28, 1999. Source: Codex Alimentarius Commission, Timetable of Codex Sessions 19981999, (visited Aug. 4, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/ECONOMIC/ESN/codex/timetab.htm>.
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tainly become one of the next areas of controversy in the Codex. 105 Proponents and opponents of foods obtained through biotechnology are
likely examining how they might be able to attain their goals through the
Codex process.

v.

THE INTERNATIONAL PLANT PROTECTION CONVENTION.

While the Codex has experienced controversy surrounding the
adoption of some of its standards since the implementation of the SPS
Agreement, the IPPC is undergoing a major structural change to prepare
it for its new responsibilities in the world's trading system as a result of
the SPS Agreement.
A.

Background on the IPPC.

The IPPC came into force in 1952, and some 105 countries were
contracting parties to it as of November 1997 .106 According to Article I
of the IPPC, the purpose of this organization is to secure "common and
effective action to prevent the spread and introduction of pests of plants
and plant products and to promote measures for their control." 107 The
IPPC was amended in 1979, and the amended text became operative in
1991. 108
A Secretariat was established for the IPPC in 1989 by the FAQ
Conference, but the Secretariat did not begin functioning until 1993 during the Uruguay Round. 109 The purpose of the Secretariat is to coordinate international efforts concerning plant quarantine issues, to compile
information concerning plant pest outbreaks, and to provide technical
assistance to members on phytosanitary issues. 110 Like the Codex, the
105. See Codex 22m1 Report, supra note 71. See also U.S Department of Agriculture, Food
Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Codex Office, Draft United States Comments, Proposed Draft
Recommendations on the Labeling of Foods Obtained through Biotechnology, (visited Dec. 18,
1997) <http://www.usda.gov/fsis/code:x/biotech.htm>.
106. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Conference, 291h Session,
Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, C 97117 at 1 (Nov. 18, 1997).
107. With a minor exception, a comma between "plant products" and "and to promote," the
purpose of the IPPC as proposed in the 1997 text is identical to the one found in the 1979 text.
108. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/
secretar.htm>.
109. Id.
110. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, FAO technical assistance
and the Uruguay Round Agreements 14-15 (1997); Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, Activities (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/
Activit.htm>.
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IPPC Secretariat is located in Rome and operates under the aegis of the
FAo.111

Another major function of the IPPC Secretariat is to coordinate the
implementation of the IPPC through its nine regional organizations. 112
These organizations are the Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commission, the Caribbean Plant Protection Commission, the Comite Regional
de Sanidad Vegetal para el Cono Sur, the European and Mediterranean
Plant Protection Organization, the Inter-African Phytosanitary Council,
the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, the North American Plant Protection Organization, the Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad
Agropecuaria, and the Pacific Plant Protection Organization. 113 Some of
the regional organizations of the IPPC have traditionally been more active in establishing international phytosanitary standards, albeit regional
ones, than the IPPC Secretariat itself. 114
B.

Revision of the IPPC.

Of the three international organizations named in the SPS Agreement, the IPPC is currently the least prepared to fulfill the role envisioned by the WTO. Recognizing this, the FAO Conference decided in
1995 to amend the IPPC to adapt it to the new responsibilities anticipated for it in the SPS Agreement. 115 In 1996, an Expert Consultation
proposed a revised draft of the IPPC, which was distributed to contracting parties for comments. 116 After a review by members of the
IPPC, a proposed revised convention was presented to the IPPC Conference in Rome in November 1997. 117 The revised IPPC will go into ef111. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/
secretar .htm>.
112. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Regional Cooperation, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/RegCoop.htm>.
113. Id.
114. For example, the North American Plant Protection Organization, which was founded in
1976 and is comprised of plant quarantine officials of Mexico, Canada, and the United States, has
traditionally been active in creating non-binding phytosanitary standards, such as risk assessment
and export certification standards. Comments of Jean Hollebone, Executive Committee Member
for Canada to the North American Plant Protection Organization (NAPPO), North American Plant
Protection Organization: Abstracts of the 21" Annual Meeting and Colloquium on Quarantine
Security, Bulletin No. 15, at 3 (Oct. 24, 1997); See also NAPPO, NAPPO - The North American
Plant Protection Organization: Its Purpose, Goals, Projects, and Policies, (visited Aug. 11, 1998)
<http://www.nappo.org/brochure_E.htm>.
115. See Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 106, at 1.
116. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, News and Events, (visited
Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/News.htm>.
117. See generally Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note
106, at 1.
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feet after two-thirds of the IPPC's contracting parties approve it. 118
Amendments that are deemed to create new obligations for members
will go into force for each contracting party upon acceptance of such
amendments. 119
The most significant change proposed in the amendments is the creation a new standard-setting focus for the IPPC. 120 The IPPC itself does
not contain provisions relating to the establishment of standards. Instead, an ad hoc standard-setting process, which is viewed by many as
unsatisfactory, was developed in 1993 for the IPPC and was approved
by the FAO Conference. 121 Consequently, unlike the Codex and the
OIE, the IPPC does not have an extensive history of establishing new
standards. The revisions will provide the IPPC with the structure and
the capability to become a major standard-setting organization like the
Codex and the OIE.
The amendments propose other notable changes to the IPPC.
While the provisions of the current IPPC do not mention a Secretariat,
the suggested revisions do. 122 The proposed revisions also codify within
the IPPC some of the principles of the SPS Agreement, such as the use
of risk assessments, pest free areas, and harmonization. 123 Both the current and proposed amended conventions contain non-binding dispute
settlement mechanisms. 124
With its new standard-setting focus, the decisions of the IPPC
could possibly become more controversial as has occurred with some
Codex decisions. Indeed, the Secretariat of the IPPC expressed concerns
during the IPPC revision process that trade matters were possibly being
viewed as more important than plant health issues. 125 However, block
voting within the revised IPPC might be less effective than within the
Codex. Under Article X.5 of the proposed revised IPPC, if consensus
cannot be reached on a matter that comes before the IPPC' s Commission
on Phytosanitary Measures, decisions will be made by a two-thirds majority, not by a simple majority .126
118. See Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 106, at 2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 12.
121. Id. at 1, 3.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 14.
125. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Summary of the Meeting Held on 8-9 October 1996: Note by the Secretariat, at 10, G/SPS/R/6 (Nov.
14, 1996).
126. See Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 106, at 13.
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THE INTERNATIONAL OFFICE OF EPIZOOTICS.

Unlike the Codex and IPPC, the OIE has not experienced major
changes in either its standard-setting process or its structure since the
implementation of the SPS Agreement in 1995.

A.

Background on the O/E.

The OIE coordinates studies of animal diseases, informs governments of animal diseases, and assists in the harmonization of regulations
involving the trade of animals and animal products. 127 It was created in
1924 and is based in Paris. 128 As of May 1998, some 151 countries were
members of this organization. 129 The OIE differs from the Codex and
IPPC in that it does not operate under the auspices of the FAO of the
United Nations.
The International Committee of the OIE meets at a minimum once
a year. 130 This committee, which is comprised of all delegates, approves
new standards of the OIE. 131 The OIE has five regional commissions
that encourage cooperation on animal health issues in their respective
geographical areas.132
The OIE is the oldest veterinary association in the world and is
similar to the Codex in that it too has a long history of establishing
advisory international standards. 133 OIE standards are found in the
OIE' s Code, which lists standards for international trade, and Manual,
which provides the standard diagnostic procedures for animal diseases
as well as vaccine standards related to international trade. 134 The Fish
Diseases Commission of the OIE issues a separate Code and Manual
pertaining to aquatic life.13s
127. International Office of Epizootics, The OIE: The World Organization for Animal
Health (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.oie.int/overview/a_oie.htm>.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. International Office of Epizootics, Structure of the OIE (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://
www .oie.int/overview/a_struc.htm>.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL SERVICES - TRADE

(1997).
134. International Office of Epizootics, International Standards (visited Aug. 11, 1998)
<http://www.oie.int/Norms/A_norms.htm>.
135. Id.
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The OIE Since Implementation of the SPS Agreement.

The OIE has undergone relatively few changes since the implementation of the SPS Agreement in 1995. Unlike the Codex, the OIE has
not to date experienced significant controversy when creating standards.
This lack of controversy can be attributed in part to the nature of the
risks which the OIE addresses; the establishment of standards for animals and animal products does not evoke the same concerns for most
people as do the standards of the Codex, which relate to human
health. 136 And in contrast to the IPPC, the OIE prior to the Uruguay
Round Agreements was well suited to establish new standards, so the
OIE was not in need of revision.
Perhaps the most significant action of the OIE since 1995 has been
the formalization of the relationship of the WTO and the OIE through an
exchange of letters. 137 These letters state in part that the OIE and WTO
agree to consult regularly on matters of mutual interest; to be invited to
and to participate in relevant meetings held by one another; to exchange
information on a regular basis; and to assist in providing technical assistance to developing countries. 138 The agreement proposed in these letters
was approved by the OIE's International Committee in May 1997 139 and
by the General Council of the WTO in October 1997. 140

C.

The OIE and Impending Disputes.

While the profile of the OIE is possibly lower than those of the
Codex and IPPC when considering changes to these organizations since
the implementation of the SPS Agreement, the function of the OIE in the
WTO system was demonstrated in the Australia-salmon dispute. The
prominence of this international organization in resolving trade disputes
will most likely increase in the near future. Bovine spongiform en136. Although the OIE monitors and establishes standards for animal health, its standards
can also indirectly impact humans. For example, the OIE monitors for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) as this disease is carried by cattle. At the same time, however, the OIE's
regulations concerning BSE also affect humans as its regulations apply to cattle products, which
are ultimately consumed by humans.
137. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 May 1996: Note by Secretariat, at 2-3, G/SPS/R/5 (July 9,
1996).
138. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Draft Agreement Between the World Trade Organization and the Office International des Epizooties, G/SPS/W/61 (May 22, 1996).
139. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Decisions Relevant to the SPS Agreement Taken by the OIE International Committee at the 651h General Session, at 1, G/SPS/GEN/24 (July 9, 1997).
140. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Report
(1997) of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, at 1, G/L/197 (Oct. 27, 1997).
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cephalopathy (BSE), also known as "mad cow disease," 141 has significantly impacted the international trade of live cattle and beef products,
and this disease could lead to conflicts involving the WTO.
One such dispute that could result in WTO challenges concerns the
European Communities' proposal to ban the use of "specified risk
materials" (SRMs) that might pose risks regarding transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. 142 The European Communities has based its
proposal in part upon OIE standards which state that certain materials,
such as bovine brains and spinal cords originating from countries with
cases of BSE, should not be traded internationally. 143 Such a ban by the
European Communities could restrict billions of dollars worth of U.S.
pharmaceutical exports to Europe as many pharmaceutical products are
encased in gelatin capsules composed partly of SRMs. 144 U.S. officials
have claimed that the European Communities' prohibition of such products from the United States is not scientifically justified, and thus violates the European Communities' obligations under the SPS Agreement,
as the United States regularly monitors for BSE according to OIE guidelines.145 The future of the European Communities' proposed ban is in
doubt due to questions of EC member states regarding the risks of BSE
in SRM products. 146 As a result of concerns of EC member states, as
well as those of the United States, the European Communities has
delayed the implementation of its SRM proposal, and a decision on the
proposal might be made in 1999. 147 The OIE is in the process of examining such risks, and any new EC policy on SRMs would likely reflect
the OIE's opinion. 148
European countries might take issue with the U.S. policy of restricting the importation of live cattle, meat, and meat products from European countries where BSE might be present, yet has not been
detected. 149 The United States implemented such a policy in 1998 as it
contended that some European states either have less restrictive import
141. International Office of Epizootics, 651h Annual General Session of the International
Committee of the Office International des Epizooties (May 30, 1997).
142. Barshefsky Letter on SRM Ban, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sep. 19, 1997.
143. European Commission Decision on Animal Products, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, August 15,
1997.
144. Barshefsky Letter on SRM Ban, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sep. 19, 1997.
145. Id.
146. Unanimous EU Council Vote Means End to SRM Ban in Short Term, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 3, 1998.
147. EU Likely to Delay SRM Ban Again to Continue Preparing New Regime, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 6, 1998.
148. Id.
149. See Restrictions on the Importation of Ruminants, Meat and Meat Products From Ruminants, and Certain Other Ruminant Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 406 (1998).
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laws than the United States or fail to monitor adequately for this disease.
OIE standards concerning BSE could potentially become an issue in
such a dispute.
VII.

CONCLUSION.

The SPS Agreement of the WTO has expanded the visibility of the
Codex, IPPC, and OIE in the international trading system. The SPS
Agreement encourages WTO members to base their SPS measures upon
the standards of these organizations. The Codex and OIE are currently
well situated to perform the roles provided for them in the SPS Agreement. Although the IPPC in its present form is capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities given to it in the SPS Agreement, the IPPC's proposed
revisions, if approved, would facilitate the IPPC' s ability to support the
WTO system.
As demonstrated by the EC-beef hormone, Australia-salmon, and
Japan-agricultural products decisions of the WTO, the settlement of major international trade disputes can tum at least in part upon the standards of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE as these organizations' standards are
viewed as international benchmark standards under the SPS Agreement.
With the heightened importance of international standards, the standardsetting process of the Codex has become more controversial, and consensus on its new standards can no longer be assumed. The establishment of standards by the IPPC and OIE in the future might also become
more political, and possibly less scientific, as an indirect result of the
SPS Agreement. Such a trend might ultimately damage the credibility
of the Codex, IPPC~ and OIE.
It is unclear how great a role the specific trade agendas of member
countries, as opposed to scientific evidence, might affect the development of future standards. All three organizations have lengthy approval
processes for new standards, which should prevent the adoption of numerous scientifically questionable standards. In addition, although delegates to these organizations are government officials, they are scientists
as well, and their professional integrity as well as the goodwill that has
developed among them when working together might also limit the potential of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE to create standards that are scientifically unsound.
Although the possible increased politicization of the standard-setting processes of these organizations is regrettable, it is perhaps inevitable. Under the SPS Agreement, the outcome of international trade
disputes can be influenced by the conformity of a WTO member's SPS
measures with international standards. Therefore, one can expect that
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol26/iss1/4
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many governments, to the extent they can, will try to protect their current or possible future SPS measures. This will likely lead to less consensus within the Codex, IPPC, and OIE than existed during the time
prior to the implementation of the SPS Agreement. If lack of consensus
becomes the norm, the harmonization objective will likely be harmed.
Such a development may lead to increased calls for consensus standardsetting within the three entities.
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